Case 49: Executable Stack (GNU_STACK RWX)¶

Field	Value
Verdict	🟢 COMPATIBLE
Category	Quality (Compatible)
Platforms	Linux
Flags	Bad practice
Detected `ChangeKind`s	`executable_stack_removed`
Source files	`examples/case49_executable_stack/`

Category: ELF / Security | Verdict: 🟢 COMPATIBLE (bad practice)

Verdict and consumer impact¶

Both libraries export identical symbols with identical signatures and identical DWARF type layouts — the functional ABI is unchanged. The difference is in the PT_GNU_STACK program header: v1 (linked with -Wl,-z,execstack) has flags RWE (read-write-execute), while v2 (linked with -Wl,-z,noexecstack) has RW. An executable stack disables NX (No-eXecute) protection for the entire process that loads the library, making stack-based buffer overflows in that process trivially exploitable — a security regression, not an ABI break. No recompilation is required either way; the concern is deployment security posture, not compatibility.

Old/new diff¶

old/lib.c (linked `-Wl,-z,execstack`)	new/lib.c (linked `-Wl,-z,noexecstack`)
identical `compute()`/`transform()` source	identical `compute()`/`transform()` source
`GNU_STACK` segment: `RWE`	`GNU_STACK` segment: `RW`

abicheck command¶

gcc -shared -fPIC -g old/lib.c -o libstack_v1.so -Wl,-z,execstack
gcc -shared -fPIC -g new/lib.c -o libstack_v2.so -Wl,-z,noexecstack
abicheck compare libstack_v1.so libstack_v2.so

Expected abicheck finding¶

Verdict: COMPATIBLE (exit 0)

Quality Issues:
- executable_stack_removed: Executable stack removed: library now uses a
  non-executable stack — NX protection restored (good practice)

Minimum evidence¶

min_evidence: L0 — the PT_GNU_STACK program header's flags are read directly from the ELF program header table; no debug info or headers needed.

Why abicheck catches it¶

abicheck reads each binary's PT_GNU_STACK segment flags from the ELF program headers and compares the executable bit between old and new; a library that drops the executable-stack flag (or gains one) is reported as a quality finding — executable_stack_removed/executable_stack_added — rather than a break, since the exported symbols and their types are unaffected.

Runtime failure demonstration¶

No observable effect on this app — compute()/transform() return identical results in both versions, since neither function relies on stack execution. The risk PT_GNU_STACK RWE exposes is latent: it widens the blast radius of any other stack-corrupting bug in the process, it doesn't itself cause one.

# Build old library (executable stack) + app
gcc -shared -fPIC -g old/lib.c -o libstack.so -Wl,-z,execstack
gcc -g app.c -L. -lstack -Wl,-rpath,. -o app
./app
# → compute(7) = 50
# → transform(3, 4) = 11

# Swap in new library (non-executable stack, no recompile)
gcc -shared -fPIC -g new/lib.c -o libstack.so -Wl,-z,noexecstack
./app
# → compute(7) = 50
# → transform(3, 4) = 11   (identical)

# The difference is visible only in the ELF program headers:
readelf -l libstack_v1.so | grep -A1 GNU_STACK
# → GNU_STACK ... RWE
readelf -l libstack_v2.so | grep -A1 GNU_STACK
# → GNU_STACK ... RW

Safe redesign¶

Ensure every object linked into the library — especially hand-written or generated assembly — carries a .note.GNU-stack section requesting a non-executable stack, since the linker takes the union of all input objects' stack permissions:

.section .note.GNU-stack,"",@progbits

or force it at link time regardless of inputs:

gcc -shared -fPIC lib.c asm.S -o libfoo.so -Wl,-z,noexecstack

Real-world example: Fedora and Debian both enforce -Wl,-z,noexecstack via lintian/rpmlint packaging checks, rejecting packages that ship an executable stack.

Cross-tool comparison¶

abidw/abidiff operate on symbol and type ABI and have no dedicated notion of PT_GNU_STACK security metadata, so there is no equivalent finding to compare here — this is an abicheck-specific ELF hardening check.

References¶

Source files¶

CMakeLists.txt
app.c